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For a long time, the USSR was the key economic partner of the DPRK. However, after 1991, 
the share of the Russian Federation in North Korean foreign trade significantly decreased. 
Today, Russia is second among the top ten most important economic partners of the DPRK. 
This article presents a brief overview of the bilateral trade between the Russian Federation and 
the DPRK for 14 years from 2004 to 2018. Statistical and customs data were gathered from 
customs agencies of 8 Russian federal districts that are not the constituent units of the coun-
try but exist for the operation of main federal government agencies. The article utilizes the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System that is applied by Russian Customs 
Agencies, also known as the Harmonized System (HS) of tariff nomenclature. This is an inter-
nationally standardized system of names and numbers to classify traded products. Sophisti-
cated methods or specific tools (the gravity equation, partial-equilibrium trade-policy simula-
tion, etc.) were not applied to analyze the trade balance between two countries. The article is 
not meant to prove an assumption, but rather it is meant to provide a general understanding 
of the structure and extent of bilateral trade between the Russian Federation and the DPRK.
Keywords: Russian Federation, DPRK, North Korea, bilateral trade balance, trade structure, 
commodity groups.
For a long time, the USSR was the key economic partner of the DPRK. However, af-
ter 1991, the share of the Russian Federation in North Korean foreign trade significantly 
decreased. Today Russia holds the second place among the top ten most important eco-
nomic partners of the DPRK, but it’s literally means nothing as the share of trade between 
Russia and North Korea appeared to be 71 times less than with China, the DPRK’s main 
trade partner. In 2018  the top ten economic partners of the DPRK were: China, Rus-
sia, Zambia, Brazil, Germany, Switzerland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, France; with 
97.7 % the PRC’s share in the total volume of imports to the DPRK and of exports  — 
87.6 % respectively.
This paper is the brief analysis of the bilateral trade between the Russian Federation 
and the DPRK since 2004 till 2018 with the special emphasis on the bilateral trade after im-
position of the US sanctions in 2014 and under the pressure of economic and financial cri-
sis resulted in the devaluation of the Russian national currency in the second half of 2014.
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Being familiar with classic trade theory that has been developed to explain almost 
exclusively intra-industry trade among OECD countries Krugman [1; 2], Helpman [3; 4], 
Helpman and Krugman [5] we don’t consider it could be applicable in this particular case 
describing the trade between the Russian Federation and North Korea. Still the large por-
tion of trade among developed countries involves differentiated products as Evenett and 
Keller mentioned [6] and this approach was used in this paper. Worth mentioning here are 
the works of Leontief [7], Linder [8], Samuelson and Nordhaus [9], Mitra & Trindade [10]. 
Stylized facts will be presented for the percentage of trading value as well as the percentage 
of traded product categories in order to show graphically the proposed bilateral trade.
As a primary source the statistical and customs data for above-mentioned period 
from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia that although are not the constitu-
ent units of the country but exist for the operation of main federal government agencies 
is used [I–VIII]. We didn’t apply any data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service 
that was transferred couple of years ago under supervision of the Ministry of Economic 
Development as data from this Service doesn’t reflect the whole picture due to a lot of 
missing data and numbers. The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
that applied by Russian Customs Agencies, also known as the Harmonized System (HS) of 
tariff nomenclature that is an internationally standardized system of names and numbers 
to classify traded products was applied. For the total exports and imports value for each 
year diagrams reflect only commodity groups that covered more than 5 % of total exports 
or imports value for given year. Particularly, the total value of imports from the DPRK to 
Russia is too small even in compare with export from Russia to North Korea to take into 
account commodity groups that occupy less than 5 % of the total value of imports from 
the DPRK. We didn’t use any sophisticated methods or specific tools (the gravity equation, 
partial-equilibrium trade-policy simulation, etc.) to analyze the trade balance between 
two countries, the work is much more simple descriptive nature and the main goal is not 
to justify any assumption but rather to give the general understanding of bilateral trade 
structure and size between the Russian Federation and the DPRK. 
Export from Russia to North Korea
Till the mid-2000s exports value from Russia to the DPRK was not too high, but since 
2007 it had declined almost twice and never reached the same level again (Figure 1). The 
value of about $100 mln per year became a visible Rubicon that Russian export couldn’t 
cross over the following decade. 2009 and 2010 were critical years with more than 50 % 
decline in export volumes due to the consequences of 2007–2008 global financial crisis, 
still the sharp increase in 2011 is just the low base effect of 2009–2010. But since 2013 a 
constant annual exports value decline has taken place and the export recession became 
systemic.
2004–2006
During 2004–2006 the main export commodity group from Russia to North Korea 
was Code 27 (mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous 
substances; mineral waxes). During these 3 years Code 27 had covered from 83 to 89 % of 
the total export value, still none of the other commodity group had exceeded 5 % (Fig. 2). 
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As well, taking into consideration increasing of export value in 2005 (see Fig. 1), the value 
of delivered products of Code 27 commodity group increased by 16.2 % in 2005 compar-
ing with the previous year [11, p. 2].
2007–2008
In 2007  the total value of exports from Russia experienced sharp decline by 50 % 
comparing with 2006  that reflected consequences of 2007–2008  global financial crisis 
Fig. 1. The total value of exports from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2004-2018 (USD mln)
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
Fig. 2. Share of Code 27  in the total value of export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 
2004–2006
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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[12, p. 3–4; 13, p. 3–7]. This decline explained by reducing especially Code 27 commod-
ity group that dropped down by 57 % compared with 2006. Moreover, in 2008 it dropped 
down by 43.3 % more in comparison with 2007 and almost 75.5 % in comparison with 
2006 respectively. As a consequence of this decline the share of other commodities in-
creased in total value, still export of some goods increased due to the rise of their respec-
tive values in the total value of exports (for example, pulp of wood or of other fibrous cel-
lulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard (Code 47) increased by 
67 % in comparison with 2006, but didn’t exceed much its share in exports in 2005 (only 
8.2 %). However, mineral fuels still had held 75  and 43 % of the total exports value in 
2007 and 2008 respectively. Other commodity groups shares increased at that time con-
sequently in 2008 Russian exports value remained at the level of 2007 but became much 
more diversified in sense of commodity groups than it was only 2–3 years ago (Fig. 3). In 
2008 pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) pa-
per or paperboard (Code 47) increased by 285 % comparing with 2007; vehicles other than 
railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof (Code 87) increased 
by 403,6 % and machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof 
(Code 84) increased by 2305,5 % respectively.
2009–2010
2009–2010 characterized by the lowest export values for the entire reviewed period 
of 14 years (except of 2018), that reflects the consequences of 2007–2008 global finan-
cial crisis. [14, p. 14; 15, p. 6] The Great Recession significantly affected Russia-DPRK bi-
lateral trade even though North Korea is far from being completely integrated into the 
world trade system. The Great Recession met the IMF criteria for being a global reces-
sion, requiring a decline in annual real world GDP per capita, only in the single calendar 
year 2009  [16, p. 11–14]. According to the US National Bureau of Economic Research 
the recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, and thus extended over 
eighteen months [17]. The same year Russian currency fell down against US Dollar more 
by 50 %. The dynamic of Russia-North Korea bilateral trade clearly shows that it was in-
Fig. 3. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2008
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
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directly, but vigorously affected by the global financial crisis. This fact confirms the thesis 
that even totally closed economies cannot exist and develop in isolated autarkic model, 
and any assumption about total self-reliance or self-sufficiency is nothing more than a 
propagandistic cliché aimed domestic public opinion and the economic reality is that any 
global crisis directly or indirectly, but always with negative consequences, will affect even 
the most closed economy. In 2009 all commodity groups were vigorously affected by de-
cline in total value of exports with sharpest decline in export of mineral fuels and mineral 
oils that dropped down by 81.2 % in comparison with 2008. Still in 2009 there was only 
one commodity group that showed clear increase in value comparing with the previous 
year, this was products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten (Code 
11) that rose up by 102.8 %. 2008–2009 were successful for Russian agricultural sector and 
volume of cereals harvest was high, moreover, in 2008, the Russian government decided 
to provide emergency food aid to the North Korean population by putting in the DPRK 
about 3 thousand tons of wheat flour. Still the main volume of Russian humanitarian aid 
to the DPRK is provided annually through the UN World Food Program (WFP) [18, p. 6].
In 2010  the total value of exports from Russia to the DPRK slightly increased by 
8.9 %, but the structure of exports goods shifted from diversification to the domination of 
export of mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation with increasing of 
250.7 % (Fig. 4).
2011–2013
In 2011 the total value of exports from Russia to the DPRK increased by 117 % due 
to the low base effect and reached the level of pre-crisis 2007-2008. Still the structure of 
export became much more diversified than it was in 2008 and especially in 2007 and the 
general trend for diversification had prevailed [19, p. 3]. More than 31 commodity groups 
covered 40 % of total value of exports with three main groups: mineral fuels, mineral oils 
and products of their distillation; cereals and articles of iron or steel occupied 60 % of 
export in 2011. In spite of diversification process the main export group from Russia to 
North Korea was still the same — mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distil-
lation (39 %) and Code 27 practically had the same exports value as 31 other commodity 
groups exported from Russia to North Korea in 2011 (Fig. 5).
Fig. 4. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2010
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
270 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 2
In 2012 the total value of Russian exports decreased again by 35 % due to decline of 
mineral fuel and mineral oils delivered volumes by 40 % (Fig. 6). Cereals export sharply 
declined in comparison with previous year to the negligible numbers, still articles of iron 
and steel showed increasing up to 200 %. Electrical machinery and equipment and parts 
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and re-
producers exports value increased by 151.7 %. There was one more factor that could serve 
as the cause for decline of the total value of exports in 2012. At the end of 2011 after the 
death of Kim Jong-il there was no clear understanding of the future path of relations be-
tween two countries that affected bilateral trade thereof [20, p. 5–6].
In 2013 the total value of Russian exports was slightly above $100 mln had indicated 
the highest exports value since 2006. Mineral fuels still occupied the biggest share of the 
total value of exports from the Russian Federation to the DPRK. Diversification and high 
exports value was directly connected with implementation of the Hasan-Rajin railway 
Fig. 5. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2011
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
Fig. 6. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2012
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
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project. Different kinds of machinery, mechanical appliances, parts thereof and vehicles 
other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof combined 
had more than 31 % of the total value of exports in 2013. Construction works on the 
project started only in the second half of 2010  and were completed on September 22, 
2013, when reconstructed railway section from Russian Hasan station to North Korean 
Rajin port was officially put into operation. In July 2014 Rajin transshipment terminal was 
opened [21, p. 3–4].
2014–2018
In 2014  the US sanctions were imposed on the Russian Federation. It’s rather dif-
ficult to say whether that directly affected bilateral trade between Russia and North Ko-
rea immediately, but in 2014  the total value of exports from Russia declined by 20.5 % 
in comparison with 2013  [22, p. 1–2]. Mineral fuels still prevailed in the total value of 
exports from the Russian Federation to the DPRK although slightly declined by 22 % in 
comparison with the previous year (Fig. 7). Codes 84 and 87 together occupied more than 
31 % of the total value of exports in 2014 that means the further development of re-con-
structed Hasan-Rajin project and construction of cargo terminal in Rason with through 
put of 4 mln tonnes per year. But the total value of exports of different kinds of machinery, 
mechanical appliances, parts thereof and vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling 
stock, and parts and accessories thereof declined by 23.4 %. We didn’t connect this with 
sanctions but rather with finalization of Hasan-Rajin project.
In 2015 we can see the clear negative effect of sanctions affected bilateral trade be-
tween the Russian Federation and the DPRK. [23, p. 2–3] The total value of exports from 
Russian Federation to the DPRK declined only by 5.3 % still the general structure of com-
modity groups was affected significantly, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation were absolutely prevail in the total value of exports and became the Russia’s 
primary export commodity group (Fig. 8).
In 2016 the total value of exports from Russian Federation to the DPRK continued 
to decline by 13 % in comparison with 2015. [24, p. 2–3] And the only one commodity 
group (Code 27) absolutely prevailed in the total value of exports. As one can see the 
structure of export was drastically changed after the sanctions were imposed. Along 
with continuous decline in the total value of exports the diversification narrowed sharp-
ly to only one dominating commodity group that had occupied 84 and 85 % of export 
in 2015 and 2016 years. From 2008 till 2014 the structure of export from the Russian 
Federation showed clear diversification with prevail of mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation, but since 2015 the structure have came back to the situ-
ation of energy-supply domination instead of export diversification and supply of dif-
ferent kinds of machinery, mechanical and electromechanical appliances, vehicles, etc. 
During 2015-2018 the structure of export has shrunk and the value of exports declined 
simultaneously. [25, p. 2–5; 26, p. 2–3] Code 27 has occupied more than 3/4 of the total 
export volume (Fig. 9). The general trend to diversification was lost and shifted to the 
delivery of only one commodity group as it had taken place decade ago in 2004–2006. 
Nowadays one can see the similar situation with much smaller total value of exports. 
In 2018, the situation didn’t change much and Code 27 comprised 67.5 % of Russian 
exports with the total value lowest in 14 years.
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Fig. 7. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2014
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
Fig. 8. Export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2015
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [11–18].
Fig.  9. Share of Code 27  in the total value of export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 
2015–2017
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 2 273
The diversification of Russian export has narrowed year by year alongside with the 
general decrease of the total value of exports. In 2014–2018 there were only several com-
modity groups with the value of more than 5 % from the total value of exports. At the same 
time, there has been sharp increasing in the share of Code 27 from only 41 % in 2014 to 
84, 85 and 83 % respectively in 2015–2017. The situation is similar to 2004–2007 when the 
main export commodity group from Russian Federation to the DPRK was mineral fuels 
still and export articles didn’t cover even 5 % each from the total value of exports (Fig. 10).
Today the main export commodity group from the Russian Federation to the DPRK is 
the commodity group with HS Code 27 (mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes) and there are no signs that the situa-
tion will change in the mid-term. Moreover, this is the clear message about North Korea’s 
attitude to Russia as solely energy supplier but not partner in technological development.
Import from North Korea to Russia
The value of imports from the DPRK to Russia is remaining very low over decades 
even in comparison with small numbers of Russia’s export to North Korea (Fig. 11). Over 
all observing period Russian exports a greater value than it imports from the DPRK, then 
having a trade surplus or positive trade balance with North Korea for all observing time. 
North Korean import has been in downtrend for the last 8 year starting from 2010 and an 
average yearly total imports value from North Korea was fifteen times less than Russian 
exports to the DPRK. The maximum imports value haven’t exceeded $35 mln/year, while 
in 2018 the total value was only about $2 mln, became lowest over the past 14 years. It’s 
Fig. 10. Share of mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes (HS Code 27) in the total value of export from the Russian Federation to the DPRK, 2004–
2018 (USD mln)
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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easy to notice that the decrease of the DPRK’s total imports value to Russia has became 
systematic since 2013.
2004–2007
In 2004 the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation was one 
of the lowest through observing period. The main import commodity group from the 
DPRK to the Russian Federation was plastics and articles thereof (Code 39) that took 46 % 
of the total value of imports. Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; 
parts thereof (Code 84) and electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound 
recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and 
parts and accessories of such articles (Code 85) occupied altogether about 27 % of the total 
value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation (Fig. 12).
Still in 2005 the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation sig-
nificantly grew up by almost 50 % in comparison with previous year. Machinery, mechani-
cal appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof (Code 84) and electrical machinery 
and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and 
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles (Code 85) 
occupied together about 64 % of the total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian 
Federation and became two main import commodity groups. Share of plastics and articles 
thereof (Code 39) fell down by 76.7 % and occupied only 7 % of the total value of import 
but still had the 4th place in total value of imports.
Next year the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation made 
impressive progress and significantly grew up as it was a year before, but in 2006 it rose by 
Fig. 11. The total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation VS the total value of 
exports to the DPRK from the Russian Federation, 2004–2018 (USD mln)
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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almost 200 % in comparison with previous 2005 year. Three commodity groups occupied 
more than a half of the total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation. 
Three commodity groups that are Codes 84, 85 and 39 occupied totally more than 62 % of 
the value of imports. The total value of imports of these three groups rose respectively by 
160,5 %, 270,9 % and 717 % (Fig. 13). Import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation 
became diversified and obtain necessary dynamic for further growth.
In 2007 the total imports value from the DPRK reached the highest numbers through-
out observing period of 14 years, however there were clear signs of slowing down bilateral 
turnover. In 2007 the total value of imports from the DPRK grew up only by 68 % since 
it had increased twice a year before. One more interesting observation is that in 2007 the 
total value of imported commodity group designated by Code 49 (printed books, news-
papers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and 
plans) from the DPRK to Russia was as high as has never been before or after (Fig. 8). The 
4-digits HS code of this group was 4901 and it means printed books, brochures and similar 
printed matter, whether or not in single sheets. The total price was $4,3 mln. One of pos-
Fig. 12. Import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2004
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Fig. 13. Import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2006
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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sible reasons was legislative elections in the 5th State Duma that were held in the Russian 
Federation on 2 December, 2007. [27, p. 2] At that time the very popular agitation instru-
ment were leaflets that spread by electioneerers among citizens. Taking into consideration 
that all three main political parties (the United Russia, the Communist Party and the Lib-
eral Democratic Party) have good formal and informal ties with the DPRK it’s possible to 
assume that one of it or even all of them ordered printing of their propaganda leaflets from 
the DPRK. Excluding this the same three commodity groups occupied more than a half 
of the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, that are Code 84, 
85 and Code 39 that weighted about 59 % of the total value of imports. The total value of 
imports of Code 84 and Code 85 rose respectively by 106.6 % and 75.6 %, although plastics 
and articles thereof (Code 39) fell down by 29 % (Fig. 14).
In 2004–2007  there had been three main commodity groups occupied more than 
50 % of the total value of imports from North Korea, that are: Code 85 (electrical machin-
ery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image 
and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles (com-
bined 4 years total value from 2004 to 2007 is approx. $18.1 mln); Code 84 (machinery, 
mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof (approx. $13 mln); Code 39 
(plastics and articles thereof (approx. $8.2 mln)).
2008–2010
In 2008 the total value of imports from the DPRK experienced sharp decline by 60 % 
that reflects the consequences of 2007–2008 global financial crisis. The same three com-
modity groups mentioned before had continued to dominate in the import structure oc-
cupied altogether about 50.5 % of the total value of imports. Still all of these dominated 
three commodity groups experienced sharp decline in comparison with the previous year.
In 2009 the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation again 
experienced second wave of decline by 45.7 % that still was reflection of the global crisis 
Fig.  14. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federa- 
tion, 2007
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8  federal districts of Russia 
[I–VIII].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 2 277
and in 2009 the total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation came back 
to the levels of 2005. The same three commodity groups continued to dominate in the 
total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation in spite of decline of the 
total value of import that reflects solid positions of these 3 groups in the import structure. 
Those were Code 84, Code 85 and Code 39 that occupied more than 57 % of the total value 
of imports (Fig. 15).
In 2010 the total value of imports from the DPRK to Russia rose up by 120 % not only 
reflecting the low base effect but clear signs of shifting in commodity groups structure that 
previously was dominated by three commodity groups: Code 84, 85 and 39  for several 
years in a row. In 2010 these groups occupied only 40.3 % of the total value of imports 
from the DPRK, but the new commodity group — salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plaster-
ing materials, lime and cement (Code 25) appeared. Code 25 had never before occupied a 
significant share of the total value of imports till 2010 since 2004, but in 2009 it took over 
Fig. 15. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2009
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Fig. 16. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2010
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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29 % of exports value. It’s hard to say whether the structure of the total value of imports 
from North Korea to Russia became more diversified after the global crisis, but the signs 
of shifting appeared exactly in 2010 (Fig. 16).
2011–2018
In 2011 the total value of imports from the DPRK to Russia experienced slight decline 
by 12.6 %, but the structure had been changed significantly. Three commodity groups 
(Code 84, 85 and 39) dominated in the export structure for years shrank and occupied in 
2011 only 24.6 % altogether. Code 25 held the biggest share a year before in 2011 occupied 
the same share (21 %). Overall structure of exports continued to demonstrate important 
shift to bigger diversification. [28, p. 8]
In 2012 the total value of imports continued to decline by 23.5 %, showing further 
move toward diversification at the same time. Two commodity groups: Code 84 and Code 
85 occupied together 16 % of imports value. Code 25 took the second place gave the first 
one to articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted (Code 62) the 
total value of this commodity group increased by 38.9 % in comparison with 2011. Then, 
starting from 2012 Code 62 became the main commodity group imported by Russia from 
the DPRK instead of previously dominated Code 84, 85 and 39 highlighting important 
shift from the heavy industry products to the light industry ones [29, p. 31–33, 85–91].
There is one interesting observation. In 2012 in the DPRK’s import to Russia appeared 
completely unexpected commodity group — musical instruments; parts and accessories 
of such articles (Code 92), 4-digits HS code shows that it was code 9205 — Wind musi-
cal instruments “e.g. clarinets, trumpets, bagpipes, keyboard pipe organs, harmoniums 
and similar keyboard instruments with free metal reeds, accordions and similar instru-
ments, mouth organs” occupied 7 % of the total value of North Korean imports to Rus-
sia in 2012 (Fig. 17). Russian contractor geographically located in Moscow and Moscow 
Oblast and there is a strong possibility that we see here the Russian Ministry of Defense 
contract for the delivery of wind musical instruments for military bands.
In 2013 the total value of imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation contin-
ued to decline by 15.8 %. Code 84 and 85 occupied together 17 % of import value. Code 
25 occupied a significant part of the total value of imports from the DPRK to Russia dur-
ing previous several years almost disappeared from export structure [30, p. 42–171]. Inter-
esting that value of imports of musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles 
(Code 92)  increased by 62.7 % and became the second biggest commodity in the total 
value of imports after articles of apparel and clothing accessories (Code 62) occupied 42 % 
(Fig. 18).
In 2014 sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation didn’t affect too much the total 
value of imports from the DPRK immediately. Code 84 and 85 occupied together 22 % 
of imports value but articles of apparel and clothing accessories totally dominated in the 
import and occupied 48 % the total value. The value of imports of musical instruments 
(Code 92) still occupied significant share of 14 % of the total value of imports. Actually, in 
2014 Code 62 totally dominated in the North Korean import to Russia with 48 % share of 
imports [31].
The important observation is that starting from 2012 the products of light industry 
had become the main commodity group imported by Russia from North Korea instead of 
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machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof (Code 84) and 
electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof (Code 85) as it has taken place for 
several years since the middle of 2000s. This could indicate significant shift inside North 
Korea’s industry structure to the South-East Asian light industry developing model or 
even to South Korean economic model on its very early stage. It’s necessary to mention 
that exactly 2012 was the first year of Kim Jong-un rule in the DPRK (Fig. 19). 
The effect of sanctions became clearly visible in 2015, the year with the lowest value of 
imports from the DPRK to the Russian Federation since 2004. The total value of imports 
declined by 40.7 % in comparison with previous 2014. Code 62 was still the main com-
modity group imported by the Russian Federation from the DPRK alongside with fish and 
crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates (Code 03) and these two commod-
ity groups occupied altogether 58 % of the total value of imports [32].
Fig. 17. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2012
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Fig. 18. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2013
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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Code 03 was new for bilateral trade and appeared mainly due to the sale by Pyong-
yang its fishing rights in the Sea of Japan, the West Korea Bay and The East China Sea to 
China that practically deprived the DPRK of independent fishing. The value of imports of 
musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles (Code 92) was continuing to 
hold the part of import (18 %). Import of railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock 
and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; me-
chanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds (Code 86) 
is easy to explain by re-export of equipment used during construction of Hasan-Rajinn 
railway project that was officially completed at 22 of September, 2013 (Fig. 20).
In 2016 year the import structure shifted again. Code 62 predominated in the total 
value of import for several previous years was pushed out to the third place with the share 
of 14 % after vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accesso-
ries thereof (Code 87) and fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates 
Fig. 19. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2014
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Fig. 20. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2015
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 2 281
(Code 03) occupied altogether 56 % of the total value of import. Code 85 occupied 10 % of 
import value became one of constant commodity groups in the total value of imports from 
the DPRK to the Russian Federation. The value of imports of Code 92 constantly held the 
part of import (13 %) as for 2016. It was the fourth year in a row of import of wind musi-
cal instruments since 2012 ($1.1 mln in 2016) and this supports the assumption about the 
long-term contract [33].
In 2017 the total value of imports from the DPRK continued to decline, Code 62 (ar-
ticles of apparel and clothing accessories) and Code 92 (musical instruments) hold about 
59 % of all North Korean import. However, 2018 becomes the worst for bilateral trade 
when total value of imports from the DPRK didn’t exceed even $2 mln with 72 % of musi-
cal instruments as the main commodity group (Fig. 21).
Conclusion
In 2004–2007 the main export article from Russian Federation to the DPRK was min-
eral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes (Code 27), still other commodity groups didn’t cover even 5 % from total export 
value each. In 2007 there was a sharp decline in total value of exports from Russian Fed-
eration to the DPRK that reflected a consequence of global financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
Since 2008 signs of changing export structure appeared alongside with the sharp decline 
of Code 27 in the total value of exports. Export became more diversified than it was in 
2004–2007. In 2009 the total value of exports from the Russian Federation to the DPRK 
was the lowest for all reviewed period from 2004 to 2018 that reflects the consequences 
of the global financial crisis 2007–2008. The Great Recession affected significantly Russia-
DPRK bilateral trade even though the North Korea is not completely integrated into the 
world trade system. In 2009 all commodity groups were affected by decline in total value 
of exports with sharpest decline in export of mineral fuels from Russia to the DPRK. In 
2010–2014 Russian export experienced further diversification shifting from predomina-
tion of only one commodity group. In 2014 sanctions was imposed on the Russian Fe- 
deration and it affected bilateral trade. The very next year the clear negative effect of sanc-
Fig. 21. Commodities share in total import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation, 2018
* Based on statistical and customs data from Customs Agencies of 8 federal districts of Russia [I–VIII].
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tions on bilateral trade between the Russian Federation and the DPRK appeared. The total 
value of exports from Russia to North Korea declined only by 5.3 % (in comparison with 
2014) still the general structure of commodity groups was affected significantly, mineral 
fuels was absolutely prevail in the total value of exports and became the Russia’s primary 
export commodity group. The structure of export was significantly changed after the sanc-
tions were imposed. Along with continuous decline in the total value of exports the diver-
sification narrowed sharply to only one dominating commodity group that has occupied 
84-86 % of export in 2015–2017. From 2008 till 2014 the structure of export from the Rus-
sian Federation was diversified with prevail of mineral fuels, but since 2015 the structure 
came back to the situation of energy-supply domination of 2004–2007 instead of export 
diversification and supply of different commodity groups. Today mineral fuels, mineral 
oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes (Code 27) 
is the main commodity group exporting from the Russian Federation to the DPRK and 
there no signs that the situation will be changed in the mid-term.
From the other side the value of import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation 
is very low in comparison with the value of export to the DPRK from Russia still we can 
indicate several commodity groups that has occupied the significant share of the total 
value of import at least for several years in a row. In 2004–2007 there have been three com-
modity groups occupied more than a half of the total value of import from the DPRK to 
Russia, that are machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof 
(HS Code 84), electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders 
and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and 
accessories of such articles (HS Code 85) and plastics and articles thereof (HS Code 39). 
In 2007 the total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian Federation was the high-
est throughout observing period of 12 years, however there were signs of slowing down 
of trade dynamics. And in 2008 the total value of import from the DPRK to Russia expe-
rienced sharp decline by 59 % that reflects the consequences of the global financial crisis 
2007–2008, then in next year the total value of import from the DPRK to the Russian 
Federation came back to the levels of 2005. Since 2011 the slow shift in commodity groups 
structure have taken place, two “main” commodity groups (Code 84 and 85) occupied 
together only 16 % of imports value. Starting from 2012 articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted (Code 62) became the main commodity group im-
ported by the Russian Federation from the DPRK instead of Code 84 and Code 85 as it 
had taken place since the middle of 2000s, that highlighted significant shift in import 
from the products of heavy industry to the products of light industry. The effect of sanc-
tions became clearly visible in 2015, the year with the lowest value of import from the 
DPRK to the Russian Federation since 2004 when the total value of import declined by 
40.7 % in comparison with previous 2014 year. Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles (Code 85) have became one of con-
stant commodity groups in the DPRK’s import to the Russian Federation during obser- 
ving period from 2004 till 2018.
The value of imports from North Korea to Russia always has been extremely small. 
In 2018 Russia was on fourth place after China, Zambia and Germany among the DPRK’s 
main importing partners. Still in 2017 Russia was on 16th place; 2016 — 10th; 2015 — 
24th and in 2014 — 16th. It should be mentioned that Russia appeared in the 4th place in 
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2018 not due to increasing of import from the DPRK or bilateral trade turnover, but just 
because of reduction the total amount of countries imported goods from North Korea. 
Existing insignificant North Korean import has a very clear downtrend that has become 
systemic since 2010. As have been mentioned the average yearly value of Russia’s exports 
to the DPRK have exceeded the value of North Korea’s imports to Russia by fifteen times 
for the last 14 years (in 2018 by sixteen times). The total value of imports from the DPRK 
in 2018 became the smallest for the last 14 years. Today there are no preconditions for in-
creasing of the DPRK’s import to Russia in the mid-term. Still the increasing the share of 
Code 62 commodity group (articles of apparel and clothing accessories) is very important 
especially taking into consideration that this shift took place at the first year of of Kim 
Jong-un rule and may indicate an attempt to carry out a kind of industrial reforms with 
emphasis on the light industry development. At the same time, the complete disappea- 
rance of Codes 84 and 85 previously widely presented in the DPRK’s import structure is 
caused by implementation of the UN Security Council sanctions restricted trade opera-
tions specifically with these commodity groups among others.
There is no solid reason to assume any important changes in the structure and dy-
namics of bilateral trade between Russia and North Korea in the nearest years under the 
current political conditions. With a high degree of confidence it could be argued that 
the main export commodity group from the Russian Federation to the DPRK will re-
main Code 27 (mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous 
substances; mineral waxes) and Russia’s only one role in the eyes of North Korean politi-
cal establishment will be the role of energy supplier. Situation regarding to import from 
North Korea is even worse, since in 2018 almost all import from the DPRK consisted of 
a single contract (musical instruments) valued $1.4 mln with the total value of imports 
of $2 mln. Moreover, there are no assumptions neither real steps for the development of 
bilateral trade.
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